By: Jeff McDonough
Tank.
One may associate this word with warfare, or fish, or oil, or perhaps someone referred to as a “tank,” who can both withstand and mete out punishment. In basketball, however, the word connotes something entirely different. In the context of the NBA, the word “tank” doesn’t evoke the typical thoughts of something big, bulky and robust — unless we’re talking about the albatross the league now has on its hands. The phrase “tanking” as we know it, comes from the boxing parlance for throwing a fight, or to spell it out even further, losing on purpose. And tanking in the NBA has become a hot-button issue, both for fans who see it as something pernicious to the health of the game, and to those who don’t enjoy the NBA and cite this as one of their reasons.
There are those who see the merits of tanking, however, both in the stands and in NBA front offices. It’s a common narrative that pops up among fanbases in any draft-based sport: we’re already having a losing season, so I’d like us to be as bad as possible to ensure the best draft pick. We see that type of talk amongst fans going through a long, tough year and who want to look toward the future. But when a team starts out the season saying that their Plan A is to compete for the league’s worst record from the jump — whether they’re saying it explicitly or with their personnel decisions — that’s a much more radical way of looking toward the future.
Even if you only have the most opaque awareness of the NBA, you are likely familiar with the fact that the Philadelphia 76ers stink. They lose A LOT. They have gone 19-63 and 18-64 the last two seasons respectively, losing 11 more games than any other team in that span. In early 2014, they tied an NBA record for losing 26 consecutive games. So maybe you’re thinking, “Wow, it’s time to clean house in that organization.” Well, these on-court struggles actually coincide with when the new regime took over, and local fans and ownership alike aren’t even discouraged because they say that this is all part of “the process.” And that process seems to involve not trying to win basketball games.
When Sam Hinkie took over as the General Manager and President of Basketball Operations for the Philadelphia 76ers in May 2013, the team had just completed a decently competent, if not ho-hum, season where they finished ninth in the Eastern Conference and missed the playoffs by four games. There were hopes of a bright future, however. Their 22 year-old point guard Jrue Holiday was named to the All-Star team. The previous season saw Philadelphia qualify for the playoffs as an 8-seed, led by All-Star small forward Andre Iguodala — who was dubbed the “poor man’s,” nay, the “homeless man’s LeBron” for his versatility. No? That was just me? — and upset a Bulls team in Round 1, who had the NBA’s best record but lost Derrick Rose to a torn ACL in Game 1 of the series. In the Conference Semifinals, they pushed the “Big Four” era Celtics to seven games before bowing out. My point is that this was a fun squad! Aside from the recent All-Stars, they had guys like Thad Young, Evan Turner and Spencer Hawes, which is to say, the team Hinkie inherited had generally been well liked in the city. They just had a fun little run, and while not contenders, they had some pieces to keep growing as they chased the playoffs. But it wasn’t all rosy.
The previous regime was coming off some blunders in the not-so-distant past. The last offseason in the pre-Hinkie era saw the calamitous trade for Andrew Bynum. Philly worked their way into the Lakers’ trade for Dwight Howard with eyes on acquiring Bynum, who had just been named Second Team All-NBA. To obtain the 24-year-old All-Star, the Sixers were forced to take on the contract of the decomposing Jason Richardson, while giving up Iguodala — who was a US Olympian at that time and the reigning Finals MVP at this time — along with the #15 pick that year Moe Harkless and young bigman Nikola Vučević. Let’s parse through the present day implications of that trade, shall we? Harkless has shown both promise and inconsistency, but at age 22, the book on him is certainly still unwritten. We all know the player that Iguodala was and still is. However, three years later, Vučević is clearly the crown jewel of this trade, partly due to the short stays most of these guys had with their new teams. In fact, of the 13 players involved in the four-team Dwight Howard trade from 2012, only Vučević is still with the team that traded for him. He averaged 19.3 points and 10.9 rebounds for the Magic this year, and is under contract for four more seasons at a reasonable salary. Oh, and then there’s Richardson. He played 52 games in three years for Philadelphia, averaged less than 10 points per game, participated in 17 total wins by the team, made $18.6 million and only just hit free agency this month if any of your teams are interested. Hello?
Bynum, of course, came down with arthritis in his knees before training camp, reinjured himself bowling during the season, played zero games as a Sixer, left in free agency the next offseason, played one more year as a locker room cancer with both Cleveland and Indiana and is now retired — officially or unofficially — at age 27. It was not simply one bad trade that had hurt the organization though. The implications of the disastrous signing of Elton Brand to a five-year, $82 million contract were felt for years. In the final year of his contract — also the year before Hinkie took over — Brand was waived via the amnesty clause, which cleared his contract from the 76ers’ salary cap, but paid him his $18 million salary in full. The move was done, in part, so that the team could sign career knucklehead Nick Young to a one-year deal. Are you sensing a theme? So while this had been decently fun team when Hinkie took over, it was also one that had struggled to build a winner, or even compete, in the years since trading away former-MVP Allen Iverson midway through 2005-06 season — another trade that netted little return on investment by the way.
In order to understand what the 76ers and Hinkie have been doing the past two years, you need to consider his background. He was born in 1977 in the Netherlands where his father was working for the multinational corporation Halliburton. He studied business at the University of Oklahoma — southwest of Marlow, OK where he spent most of his childhood — and graduated summa cum laude. His first job out of college was with investment firm Bain Capital, which will ring a bell for many because of its famous co-founder Mitt Romney. Hinkie then got his MBA at Stanford University. He parlayed this background in business to work as an advisor for two NFL teams, the San Francisco 49ers and Houston Texans, helping them with using statistical analysis in regards to draft strategy. After working for the Houston Rockets for a few years in smaller roles, Hinkie was promoted in 2007 and became the youngest vice president of any team in the NBA.
In Houston, Hinkie worked alongside GM Darryl Morey and the Rockets became the league’s foremost flag bearers for the analytics movement. On the court, it is all about efficiency, which involves two main things, shooting threes and driving to the hoop, whether for dunks, lay-ups or foul shots. Off the court, the strategy is all about acquiring assets in order to turn them into multiple franchise players, which will hopefully lead you to a championship. The Morey strategy is not about being “decent” and chasing the playoffs. It’s an acknowledgment that basketball is a sport — perhaps more so than any other team sport — dictated by individual talent, and that basically, you need superstars to win a title. While this ideology has not borne out in terms of rings quite yet, Morey has turned around a franchise that was subpar for a decade. Through a perspicacious understanding of complex mathematics, combined with good old-fashioned wheelin’ and dealin’, Morey and the Rockets acquired that coveted superstar talent, improved each of the last three seasons and look to be a championship contender again this year. At the start of the NBA season, only about six teams, give or take, have a realistic shot to win it all. You just have to give yourself a chance to be one of those teams and hope you strike oil.
So after he and his buddy Darryl spearheaded the now-burgeoning analytics movement, Hinkie came to the 76ers as a highly-touted thinker eager to implement that philosophy onto a middling team. It makes sense then that his first splash as GM was made on draft night when he traded his All-Star point guard, the aforementioned Jrue Holiday, to New Orleans for the #6 pick Nerlens Noel and a first round pick the following year. I loved the trade for Philly immediately. While Holiday was Hinkie’s best player, because of an overabundance of talented point guards throughout the league, he was then, and still remains, around the 20th best player at that position. Plus, the team clearly wasn’t ready to contend for anything and a rebuild seemed prudent. Noel, of course, was a bigman with impressive defensive prowess, who was slotted for the #1 pick before injury concerns prompted his fall to #6. Acquiring him served two purposes: it geared for the future by adding the most talented player in the draft and it helped them be bad in the present by replacing an All-Star with someone who might not play all year (SPOILER: He didn’t). It was with this move that the 76ers let the world know that “Operation: Tank” was commencing. Hinkie was letting his freak flag fly.
So the Sixers were now armed with two draft picks next year, the promising-but-injured Noel and a 6’6” rookie point guard — to replace the departed Holiday — in Syracuse’s Michael Carter-Williams, whom they selected with their own pick at #10. While they had these assets, their roster wasn’t exactly conducive to winning games in the coming 2013-14 season — which, hey, only improved their chances at drafting “Maple Jordan” Andrew Wiggins! Despite the apparent worsening of the roster, Philadelphia started the season 3-0, including a thrilling opening night victory over the back-to-back defending champion Heat. Carter-Williams was named Eastern Conference Player of the Week after filling up the box score like peak-Jason Kidd and suddenly it looked like our tanking accusations were unwarranted. After all, the Phoenix Suns started 5-2 when they, along with Philly, were the two teams who appeared to most glaringly dismantle their rosters in order to improve their chances in the “Riggin’ for Wiggins” sweepstakes. The Suns would go onto win 48 games and narrowly miss the playoffs by one game after completely abandoning all desires to tank. Things went in a much different direction in the City of Brotherly Love.
Their early success was very fleeting, as they fell to 6-12 …and then 8-21 …and then 14-31 … and then 15-57 after their infamous record of 26 straight losses… before finally finishing at 19-63, the second worst record in the league. At the trade deadline, as bad teams often do, they traded two of their best players in versatile Spencer Hawes and former #2 pick Evan Turner. Make sense. You’re not going to win now, try to cash-in your assets to build for the future. The problem is that looking back, these trades brought them little discernible value. Hawes went to Cleveland for Earl Clark (immediately waived), Henry Sims and what would become the #39 pick. Sims played a lot during his year and a half in Philly, just not very well, and the team recently let him walk rather retain him at a measly $1.18 million salary. The 39th pick turned into Jerami Grant, who’s okay, I guess, but is really more known as the less-talented brother of Jerian Grant, the Knicks rookie who played at Notre Dame. Hawes’ level of play dipped after the trade, as he struggled to gain footing in both Cleveland and Los Angeles, but I expect him to have a bounce back year in Charlotte. The Turner trade was more egregious. He and Lavoy Allen went to Indiana so that the Sixers could obtain the privilege of buying out Danny Granger and what ended up as the LAST pick in this year’s draft, some Serbian dude who’s not coming to the NBA. Allen remains with the Pacers as a mediocre reserve bigman. Turner, however, thrived for Coach Brad Stevens last year in Boston as a triple-double threat who can play three positions — on a steal of a contract at two years, $6.7 million, I might add.
I want to digress, for a second. The rebuild in Boston is one with which I’ve had no qualms. They unloaded two aging superstars to the Nets at exactly the right time, while procuring three first round picks and a pick swap (the right to swap first round picks with Brooklyn if their pick is better). And the Nets are no contender after getting fleeced in this deal, so the picks could be good. They acquired point guard Isaiah Thomas — no, not that Isiah Thomas — for free-agent-to-be Marcus Thornton and the Cavaliers’ first round pick this coming year …you think that’s gonna be a high one? Thomas, while not a Hall of Fame point guard like his namesake, is an explosive scorer, who spurred the Celtics to a playoff run with the second best record in the East after his acquisition. While not a star, his style involves driving to the hoop and making threes — isn’t that the perfect offense for a guard in 2015? — and I truly believe he could be the sixth man on a championship team. Oh yeah, and Thomas has three years and $19 million left on his contract in an offseason where Reggie Jackson got paid $80 million. And no, not that Reggie Jackson either. This is what a smart trade looks like. They acquired a talented player, with years left under contract, which happens to be affordable, while giving up nothing in return. The only crime of Celtics’ GM Danny Ainge during this rebuild is that he hired too good of a coach to tank.
Brad Stevens, who took mid-major Butler to the NCAA Championship game in consecutive years, implemented his system, while highlighting his players’ skillsets and took this ragtag group of players to the East 7-seed. They somehow got better AFTER they traded their two best player in Rajon Rondo and Jeff Green, which were also great trades at the right time by the masterful Ainge. THIS is what a good rebuild looks like. The GM acquires assets while the coach develops the talent. Now there’s still work to be done. Boston has twelve role players, good players, guys who could be the fifth-to-tenth best players on a championship contender. The problem is that the Celtics are still missing their best two players, but if/when Ainge figures that out, Stevens has these guys ready. Only the GM/Coach duos in San Antonio and Miami have a claim to being better than what they got going on up in Boston.
Back to the task at hand. The Sixers, now with more talent lost but seemingly little gained, were back at the draft. In the Hinkie era, draft day is like the NBA Finals for Sixers fans. Man, it seems crazy to think we’ve only had two seasons and three offseasons with this man. Despite, Philly’s abysmal season, they were not guaranteed a top pick because the NBA has a draft lottery system of randomization, ya know, to dissuade this whole tanking thing. And see, that’s the thing. It’s not like the NFL, where the Colts know they’re getting Andrew Luck if they lose out. Basketball basement-dwellers are at the mercy of bouncing ping pong balls, like some chain-smoker with a Mega Millions ticket. So Lady Luck does not grant Philadelphia the Mother’s Mercy and they fall to pick #3. And in a moment of déjà vu, the 76ers selected Joel Embiid, an injured bigman, who would miss the entire season, but would’ve gone #1 if it wasn’t for the injury concerns. Dating back to Bynum, it was the third season in a row that Philadelphia’s most talented player was a bigman they had just acquired who didn’t play a single minute. That streaks looks to be extended again this year by Embiid again.
Philadelphia had a second top-ten pick with which to play, however. They used the pick they acquired in the Holiday trade to draft tough-as-nails point guard Elfrid Payton at pick #10… who they promptly traded to Orlando for the #12 pick, Croatian bigman Dario Šarić, who is still playing in Turkey and may not come to Philly for two more seasons. The Sixers also received a 2015 second round pick in the Payton trade… that they traded to the Knicks for two more future second round picks. Do you see how it works now? Hinkie keeps kicking the can down the road. But tomorrow isn’t just ONLY a day away, it’s ALWAYS a day. Oh, here’s your obligatory pic link. Wait, NO NO NO! Ah, much better. Before the season started, they also traded Thaddeus Young to Minnesota for Luc Mbah a Moute (Philly’s veteran presence last year, now an injured free agent), Alexey Shved (played 17 games in Philly, was traded two more times, finished with the Knicks, now playing in Russia) and the Heat’s top-10 protected first round pick.
Now this is another piece of inauspicious luck for the 76ers. Miami had a talented team, but after being decimated by injuries, fell just far enough in the standings to keep their #10 pick, which they used to draft Justise Winslow — who, ya know, was the steal of the draft and might be a James Harden that plays defense, or whatever. Now they will get Miami’s pick next year (again, if it falls outside the top-10), but Miami looks like a top-2 team in the East if healthy, so I don’t imagine it will be a very high pick. ‘Tis life when your master plan hinges on the whims of a ping pong ball.
So let’s get to the start of last season, where the Sixers didn’t give even a glimmer of false hope like the season prior, by starting 0-17 — good for second-worst start in NBA history. They never got much better at any point and finished 18-64, “trumping” last season by a game. They didn’t win three games in a row at any point all year. Yet again, however, this wasn’t good enough for dead last in the league. In fact, they finished 28th out of 30, a slot better/worse…? than the year prior. At the trade deadline — if the draft is their Christmas, the deadline is at least their Chanukah or something — Philadelphia traded away their lone bright spot of the season in versatile, high-motor rookie KJ McDainels and Carter-Williams, the reigning Rookie of the Year. This is when Sixers fans, at least some of them, began to grow frustrated in “the process.” While the moves prior hadn’t exactly worked out in glorious fashion, they all made sense at the time, and seemed to be steering the team in the right direction. But unloading two young, athletic, talented players? That didn’t exactly jive with everyone.
McDaniels was a unique situation. Taken at pick #32 at top of the second round, McDaniels turned down the standard second round offer made to him of a four-year deal with the first two years guaranteed. He instead signed a one year nonguaranteed deal for half a million dollars that allowed him to become a restricted free agent after the season. This was another symptom of being really bad: players don’t want to come to your team — even rookies drafted in the second round, apparently. McDaniels bet on himself and won BIG. As opposed to being on a horrible team, in a cold city, locked into a deal that gave him little in money or security, he now has a three-year, $10 million contract with the Houston Rockets, who look like one of the five best teams in the league, in this writer’s humble opinion. To obtain him last year, Houston gave Philly Isaiah Canaan and Richaun Holmes, who are young players with at least some promise …just a lot less than McDaniels. This was a bad look for Hinkie.
The Carter-Williams trade left more room for optimism. While MCW did show promise as a passer and defender, the dude cannot shoot. Like at all. So Hinkie, in his continual quest for stars, deemed that MCW was not one, and tried to get some value back for him while there was still time. The Bucks and Coach Jason Kidd — once a lengthy point guard who couldn’t shoot in his own right — saw potential in the young man, as he assembled a team of roaming, positionless youngsters with long arms, who swarm like madmen on defense. For MCW, Philly was able to obtain the protected first round pick of the repugnant Los Angeles Lakers. Yet again, though, the ping pong balls bounced the wrong way on draft night and the Sixers have not received this payment quite yet.
There was a dream scenario — given the hashtag of #OneSixEleven by those process-trusting fanatics — where Philly would win the lottery and pick first, the Lakers’ pick would fall to sixth and the Heat pick would fall to 11th, just outside their protections. They didn’t even come close. The Heat picked Winslow at #10 as I mentioned and the Lakers not only kept their pick, but rocketed up past Philly to pick #2, as Philly was left with another bronze consolation, the third pick. In a possibly fortuitous twist of fate, the Lakers went with point guard DeAngelo Russell over Duke bigman Jahlil Okafor, who had long been projected ahead of him. Hinkie once again chose a bigman who had fallen after once being projected as top pick — although Okafor’s drop was not due to injuries like past picks. The Lakers’ thinking (presumably) was that a post-up center who plays no defense, has no outside shot and is a terrible free throw shooter in 2015 isn’t what it once was. Having that said, man, is it an impressive postgame. And Russell, while a stellar passer, isn’t a great athlete, shooter or defender. So the Lakers’ risky change of heart, may be the first bit of good luck the 76ers received in ages.
Things got even better a few weeks later when the dumpster fire that is the Sacramento Kings inexplicably gave away several assets to the 76ers in order to free up cap space so they could sign Rajon Rondo and Kosta Koufos. Really? You’re mortgaging the future for those guys? Anyway, the Sixers’ haul for absorbing Carl Landry and Jason Thompson, who each have two years and about $13 million total left on their contracts, was Nik Stauskas (the #8 pick in 2014), a protected first round pick and two pick swaps. This is highway robbery. Why? Just why? And the pick swaps tacked on at the end are the kicker. Smart teams get these simply by asking, because dumb teams don’t care, and think, “Whatever. We’re gonna be way better than you guys!” with the unearned arrogance of the O’Doyle brothers. And it usually ends equally as bad. Ask the Nets, who were bumped from #15 to #29 because of a pick swap they gave up in 2012 for the privilege of paying Joe Johnson $93 million for the next four seasons.
So with two dreadful seasons and three busy offseasons in the books, where are we now with this franchise? What has all the tanking and unloading of players even gotten them? Well, that’s the issue here. Are they really in that much better of a position than the summer of 2013 when Hinkie took over? They have three talented, if not one-dimensional, high-picks who all play the same position, and that position isn’t as valued in 2015. The Warriors just won the title with a 6’7” dude playing center. And as mentioned with Embiid, one of them may never play basketball again. They have Stauskas, but I don’t even know if he’s good or if he’s already a bust. Drafted high for his shooting prowess, he shot .322 from three last season — 35% is league-average for a point of reference. Then they have guys like Hollis Thompson and Robert Covington, undrafted players who showed at least enough promise to be deemed “worth-hanging-on-to.” Covington was scooped up from the D-League, in a very sage move by Hinkie, on an affordable nonguaranteed deal that keeps him under team control for four years. Besides these guys… not much else.
In terms of future draft picks, Philadelphia has four next season. They’ve got their own, which figures to be high again anyone would assume. They’ve got the Thunder’s, which figures to be low because it is top-15 protected and, more importantly, the Thunder are really good. They have Miami’s after their narrow miss last year — it is again top-10 protected, but the Heat’s talented roster looks to put their pick in the bottom-10 of the draft, if healthy. Finally, they have the Lakers’ pick after that near-miss as well. This is the coup de grâce of their acquisitions, with only the Holiday trade in the running for netting Philly as much. The Lakers stink, bro. They’re dreadful. But hopefully they’re not too bad. Their pick is still top-3 protected after all. With Kobe Bryant and Nick Young returning, Roy Hibbert, Lou Williams and Brandon Bass signing on and young guns DeAngelo Russell and Julius Randle getting their first taste of (real) action, the Lakers don’t look like a top-3 pick team if healthy. It’s kind of the perfect storm for the Sixers with the Lakers’ pick. The Lakers are too good to be the worst, but not even close to good enough to sniff the playoffs.
They also have an ungodly throng of future second round picks. But what does that mean? Other teams have capitalized on the talent still available in round two and the cheap contracts they play on. The 76ers haven’t reaped those rewards. They made ten draft picks in the second round the last two years. It looks like two or three of them will make the roster this year and not play much. Acquiring assets is great, and second rounders can certainly be assets. But if you have an overabundance of them and you don’t package them into other assets, then you’re just wasting picks on guys who don’t make your team.
In theory, I agree with a lot of Hinkie’s philosophies. There’s no honor in reaching for the middle. They don’t put up banners for 8-seeds, for the most part. There is value in young players playing in meaningful games and learning good habits. When you’re on an awful team with no pressure to win, and no accountability if you aren’t playing the right way, how exactly do you become a better player? This isn’t an indictment of Head Coach Brett Brown. He was brought over from the Spurs organization and might be a great coach with the right players, but none of these guys are developing. Nerlens Noel looked pretty good in his rookie season, but he doesn’t look like a superstar, and I thought that was the whole point. That was the reason Carter-Williams was jettisoned. Young guys playing on teams competing to get into the playoffs has immense value. Teams don’t just jump from the lottery to the finals in a jiffy — unless you’re a team that signs LeBron James as a free agent, of course. You need to gain that experience in order to improve.
Michael Jordan had to suffer years of losing to the Celtics and Pistons before he became the player who three-peated twice. Look at the jump John Wall has made since gaining some playoff experience, even in the first two rounds. It’s gone from fans wondering whether the Wizards should give him a max contract before he hit free agency, to now maybe being the most complete point guard in the league — with a stat line of 17.6 points, 10 assists, 4.6 rebounds, 1.7 steals and 0.6 blocks per game. You can’t simply flip a switch with young players and say, “Okay, we’re ready to win now.”
Hinkie is right: if you’re going to be bad, be really bad. Be bad enough to get the top pick, still the easiest route to a superstar. There’s another problem with that, though. Nothing is guaranteed in the NBA Draft Lottery. You could be the worst team in the league — you could go 0-82, in fact — and your only reward is a 25% chance at the top pick. So that means there’s a 75% you don’t get the top pick after all of that. I say the best method of rebuilding isn’t what the 76ers or Celtics or Rockets have done, but a combination of all three methods. You should try to get as high a pick as possible. You should always be acquiring assets. You should flip players at their maximum value, or if they’re on their way out anyhow. A key ingredient, though, is one that the Celtics have tried desperately and the Rockets have accomplished, but the 76ers seem to have forgotten: luring star talent to your team.
No one wants to play for the Philadelphia 76ers. That’s the problem with trying to be as bad as you can possibly be. It will take years for players to get over the stigma this franchise has earned. What would signing with Philly entail? The winters will be cold, the team will lose and you might get traded at any moment on the impulse of a mad scientist. The 76ers could hope that their stockpiled assets will put them in position to acquire a star via trade, but at some point that player has to sign a contract to stay there. Players rarely get traded with three years left on their deals, ya know? Look at all Cleveland gave up to get Kevin Love, and then they still had to woo him into accepting a $100 million contract.
You also don’t have to be this smart to fall backwards into a superstar. In the NBA, lucky is always better than good. The Cavaliers were in total disarray after losing LeBron James. They were bad, but kept trying to win in order to prove Papa Dan right that the Cavs didn’t need LeBron. Well, they did, obviously, but Cleveland never once started a season trying to tank. They made dumb signings and bad trades, and you know what happened? They won the lottery three of their four years without LeBron. That’s all it takes; the bouncing of some ping pong balls.
The Timberwolves and Lakers entered last season trying to win. They made trades and signed free agents, but when injuries overwhelmed them, they packed it in and accepted their fate in the lottery. Those are the two teams that picked ahead of Philly in the 2015 draft — two teams that tried to be good but sucked at it. That is the correct way to tank. You always try to make your team better, without signing dumb contracts or mortgaging your future, and if your squad struggles, you pack it in. You don’t need to strip your roster every offseason. The most annoying thing about this form of tanking is that it doesn’t work.
So we’ll see what happens going forward with Dr. Hinkie’s monster. They have those three talented-but-flawed centers. They have some other young guys. They have all those draft picks. They have the support of the owner. They have the support of the fans, as hard as that is to believe. The smartest thing about all of this is the job security Hinkie has bought himself. “I’ve got a 5-7 year plan, just trust me on this!” I don’t have a problem with Hinkie’s philosophy. I generally agree with it. The problem lies in the execution. You can keep kicking the can down the road, but eventually you get bored, because that’s a stupid game and you get exhausted after long. That’s what’s ultimately going to happen here, unless the 76ers can do what every other championship team has done at some point along the way… get lucky.
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